This program is tentative and subject to change.

Mon 24 Aug 2026 11:45 - 12:15 at HO221 Presidents Room - Morning Session 2

We present a lightweight approach to runtime security policy verification for resource-constrained embedded systems, built on a novel C++ implementation of miniKanren - the first such implementation suitable for embedding in constrained environments. Existing approaches to security policy verification rely on static analysis, heavyweight formal methods, or operating-system-dependent runtime monitors, none of which are suitable for continuous, on-device enforcement in embedded contexts. Our implementation operates within a 64~KiB stack-allocated arena with no heap allocation, and verifies policies at a median latency of 17.0~\textmu{}s for access control queries and 3.6~\textmu{}s for network policy queries. We demonstrate the approach through two case studies: access control enforcement and network communication policy verification in an IoT device network. Both case studies produce structured, explainable violation reports that identify the specific rule violated and the cause of the violation, supporting the audit trail requirements of emerging regulatory frameworks such as the EU Cyber Resilience Act.

Lightweight Runtime Security Policy Verification Using an Embeddable C++ miniKanren (LightweightRuntimeSecurity.pdf)410KiB

This program is tentative and subject to change.